

Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01

PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 OMB-01 TRSE-00

DRC-01 /162 W

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R 181010Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8207

INFO AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAIGON 18168

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OTRA, HU, VS

SUBJ: MARJAI VISIT TO VIETNAM

REF: A. STATE 205686; B.USUN 3983

1. IN OUR DEALINGS WITH THE HUNGARIANS ON VIETNAM, WE MUST KEEP IN SIGHT THE UNDERLYING REALITY OF HUNGARIAN POLICY TOWARD THE ICCS, WHICH IS TO FRANKLY SUPPORT THE DRV AND FOLLOW SCRUPULOUSLY A MOSCOW LINE THE AIM OF WHICH IS THE EVENTUAL DESTRUCTION OF THE GVN. GIVEN THIS, WE DO NOT SEE HOW OUR INTERVENING ON BEHALF OF MARJAI WILL ADVANCE US INTERESTS.

2. IN CONSIDERING MATTER WE MUST WEIGH WHETHER UNPLEASANTNESS CAUSED BY EXCLUSION OF MARJAI COULD HURT OUR INTERESTS AS MUCH AS A SUCCESSFUL EFFORT (ASSUMING SUCH TO BE POSSIBLE) TO PERSUADE GVN TO ADMIT HIM. MARJAI WOULD, IF ADMITTED TO SAIGON, WITH LITTLE DOUBT DO HIS BEST TO CAUSE HARMFUL PUBLICITY FOR THE GVN WHILE HERE, TAKING FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE GVN REFUSAL TO PERMIT HIM

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TO VISIT LOC NINH. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE HUNGARIANS

WOULD REQARD OUR INTERVENTION ON THEIR BEHALF BY MODERATING THEIR HARD LINE STAND IN THE ICCS. ON THE CONTRARY IT SEEMS CLEAR FROM WHAT FONMIN PETER SAID IN NEW YORK (REF B) THAT THE HUNGARIANS NOW INTEND TO USE THE ICCS AS A FORUM FOR INTENSIVE POLITICAL PROPAGANDA SUPPORTING THE PRG AND DEROGATING THE RVN.

3. THE GVN REACTION IN THIS MATTER IS EASY TO UNDERSTAND. THE HUNGARIANS HAVE BEEN AHEAD OF THE POLES IN THE ICCS IN THEIR COMMON EFFORT TO PROTECT THE PRG AND DEFAME THE GVN. THEY HAVE LED THE MOVEMENT TO USE THE BUDGET CRISIS TO HOBBLE THE ICCS, AND MOST RECENTLY HAVE MADE A SPEECH IN THE UN (REF B) WHICH THE GVN UNDERSTANDABLY INTERPREST AS A HOSTILE POLITICAL ACT. FINALLY, WITHOUT PROPER PREPARATION, WITHOUT OBSERVATION OF USUAL COURTESIES, AND WITHOUT A VISA THEIR DEPUTY FONMIN MAKES KNOWN CASUALLY HIS IMMINENT ARRIVAL IN SAIGON. ALTHOUGH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE MIGHT POSSIBLY HAVE OVERLOOKED ALL THIS IN AN EFFORT, NOT NECESSARILY SUCCESSFUL, TO REAP SOME ADVANTAGE FROM MARJAI'S VISIT, WE MUST NOT BE SURPRISED OR DISAPPOINTED THAT THEY DID NOT DO SO BUT CHOSE INSTEAD TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGH AS A GOVERNMENT TO DENY HIM ENTRY.

4. IN OUR VIEW THE HUNGARIAN GOVT MUST SOMEHOW LEARN THAT THE GVN IS IN FACT A SOVEREIGN GOVT AND ONE NOT WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE POWER. AS ONE OF THE FOUR SIGNATORIES OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT, AND THE ONE WITH WHOM HUNGARY HAS MOST CONTACT IN ITS ICCS RLE, THE HUNGARIAN GOVT WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE GVN ON A BASIS OF RECIPROCAL COURTESY, IF NOT ON ONE OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS.IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE US OR THE ICCS FOR US TO ENCOURAGE THE HUNGARIANS IN THEIR CONTEMPTUOUS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE GVN BY EXTRICATING MARJAI FROM HIS PREDICAMENT. AND OUR DOING SO WOULD ONLY CONFIRM THE COMMUNIST IMAGE OF THE GVN AS A STOOGUE OF THE USWM

5. FOR EMB BUDAPEST. WE SUGGEST YOU MAKE THE GVN'S POSITION MORE VIVID TO THE GOH BY ASKING THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WHAT KIND OF WELCOME IT WOULD EXTEND, IF THE GVN FOREIGN MINISTER, WITHOUT APPLYING FOR A VISA OR PERFORMING THE OTHER COURTESIES USUAL IN SUCH VISIT, WERE TO LET IT BE KNOWN SUDDENLY THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO ARRIVE IN BUDAPEST ON AN UNEXPLAINED MISSION.
MARTIN

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: VISITS, TRUCE OBSERVERS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 18 OCT 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: willialc
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973SAIGON18168
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS MARTIN
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: SAIGON
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731024/aaaaarjg.tel
Line Count: 99
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 2
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A. STATE 205686; B.USUN 3983
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: willialc
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20 SEP 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <20-Sep-2001 by smithrj>; APPROVED <27-Nov-2001 by willialc>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MARJAI VISIT TO VIETNAM
TAGS: OTRA, PFOR, HU, VS, ICCS, (MARJAI)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005